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1Abstract
The purpose of this study is to present an economic theory behind the informational asymmetry in a
consumer credit market and show how it affects the formation of the loan price. The study presents
how lenders can use the available information for better loan decisions and how it affects the interest
rates that borrowers observe. The main tools against information asymmetry are the information
sharing platforms and the credit scoring models which are presented closely. The theoretical framework
follows the model of Jaffee and Russell (1976) which is modified further to fit the different information
levels that lenders can acquire about borrowers. Based on this theoretical framework the study presents
the Finnish consumer credit market and discusses of the impact that the informational asymmetry has
on the detected prices and on the market structure.
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31 Introduction
In this study I present the market setting for consumer loans that carry no collateral. I
concentrate on the problems that asymmetric information creates on the loan market. The
uncertainty of future payments and defaults is very real threat that lenders face. A borrower
usually has more information on his financial standing and future plans than a lender can
gather. This creates a risk for the lender that has to be taken into account in the pricing of the
loan contracts. On the other hand if the price is too high it might attract only the borrowers
with a high default risk.
Lenders possess different tools for evaluation of the default risk and they can get advantage on
the market by being able to detect the default risk of the borrower. Information brings power
and is an asset in a loan negotiation and pricing. If a lender can identify the risk of individual
borrower, he can evade from the market price and extract extra profit.
The Finnish loan market has seen a rapid and fast growth of a small consumer loan business. It
is typical for this market that the loan rates are very high, pricing is complex and the loan sums
are relatively small.  At the same time larger loan sums are carrying more reasonable prices. I
study the basic dynamics of the loan markets by Jaffee & Russell model (1976) and analyze
how the Finnish consumer credit market fit in this framework. I also extend the model to take
into account different levels of information that lenders possess and are able to utilize in credit
decisions.
The study method is a literature review with an empirical part of market analysis about Finnish
consumer loan market. In the Introduction chapter I am making the reader familiar with some
basic concepts of loan markets such as time value of money and asymmetric information. In the
second chapter I present the theoretical model of Jaffee and Russell (1976) that analyses loan
markets with suitable characteristics for uncollateralized loan markets. In the third chapter I
show how recent literature supports the pricing scheme of the model. The fourth chapter is
about the ways a lender can identify default risk that information asymmetry creates. The main
4implications are information sharing and credit scoring which will be presented closely. I am
also making some extensions to the Jaffee & Russell model to make it more suitable for this
study.  In the fifth chapter I present the Finnish market environment. I show the aggregate
volumes of the market, the pricing of different lenders and analyze the findings through the
modified Jaffee & Russell -model. In the seventh chapter I summarize the study and make the
conclusions.
1.1 Reasoningfortheexistenceofcreditmarketsforconsumer
 why consumers want credit in different
situations. It leads us to information asymmetry and difficulties the asymmetry produces. The
need for the consumer credit seems quite clear in common sense. People are in different
situations in their lives and have different need for the money. Some like to save and avoid
credits, some sees lending as a way to smooth their consumption possibilities over a long time,
some invest the credit in hope for revenue and some borrow money to buy food for their
family. There are multiple reasons for borrowing but I will present a few that are brought up in
economic literature.
According to the Permanent Income Hypothesis by Friedman (1957) consumer chooses his
consumption in each period based on his current wealth and future expectation of income. It
means that a current budget constraint can be overrun with debt if consumer believes that his
future  income  can  cover  it.  A  consumer  optimizes  his  utility  over  the  lifetime  and  he  can
smooth his income differences by borrowing when the income is low and saving when the
income  is  high.  This  can  be  visualized  by  taking  into  account  The  Life  Cycle  Hypothesis  by
Modigliani (1986). According to this model the life of a consumer can be considered to have
three phases. First, in the youth years of the consumer his income is low and he takes a debt for
consumption. In this stage the consumer is studying or working in a low-income job. He also has
expectations that the income will rise in the future. The second stage is the working years and
the income level becomes higher. In this stage consumer has excessive income that he uses to
pay the earlier debts and make savings for the future. In the third and last stage the consumer
retires and the income reduces again to a lower level.  In this stage the consumer can use the
savings to maintain a higher consumption level.  See Figure 1.
5Figure 1: The Life Cycle Hypothesis from Modigliani (1986).
Attanasio (1999) argued that the consumption behavior is changing depending on many factors
and it is not as stable as the life cycle model predicts. The consumption habits may change
during consumers lifetime depending on factors such as age, marital status and the size of the
family. According to the basic model of Permanent Income Hypothesis the utility is based only
on the consumption flows. Whereas, Bertola et. al. (2006) suggests that the consumer usually
reaches the same utility level with different consumption volumes depending on the life
situation.  The  main  reason  for  this  is  the  uncertainty  of  the  income  which  is  not  taken  into
account in the permanent income hypothesis. To give an example lets think about the following
situation. Consumer expects a raise in the near future and consider taking a loan to by a new
car. The raise is not yet happened so the consumer feels uncertain about it. If he takes the loan
and buys the new car, there is two options that might happen. First option is that the consumer
gets the raise and has no problem of paying the loan back. This will increace his utility while he
can cruize with a brand new car. The other option is that he does not get the raise and he has
serious problems in paying the loan back. The new car might actually reduce his total utility
because of the stress and head ache that he gets for trying to pay back the loan. In this way the
uncertainty affects the decisions of a customer.
The uncertainty that the consumers face is related to the risk that are attached to certain
decisions. Friedman (1948) argues that people act differently under a risk. Some are willing to
6take more risk in hope for larger profits, some chooses always the safest option and others
choose the risk level somewhere in between. The differences can be explained by preferences,
temper and also the shape of the
 the  credit  markets  this  different  approach  towards  risk
creates information asymmetry. The lender cannot know the borrower s risk profile and this
increases the risk that the lender is facing. The lender do not know what is the probability that
the borrower will be able to pay back the loan.
Many people are living in the wold of monthly expenditures. The house, the car, the furniture
and the hobbies are often paid with a loan. The monthly income is divided between saving and
consumption, but the consumption might have actually happened already before. The
consumption is not optimized by the money on the bank account but more of what kind of loan
expenditures one can hande with the monthly income. The new way to think seems to be often
that new Volvo does not cost 40000 euro but 400 a month. I have only 2000 on my bank
account, but I  can afford to put 400 monthly on my car. The price of the goods might be less
important than the financing arragements seller can offer. This can lead a consumer into
serious problems if the income level drops suddenly.
As a conclusion there is clearly a need for the consumer credit and as we know, there also is a
market  for  it.  People  will  apply  for  a  loan  in  different  situations  and  there  is  an  uncertainty
factor attached to the loan payments. This leads us to the lender s problem of asymmetric
information.
1.2 Timevalueofmoney
When we discuss about loans and the credit business it is essential to go through some of the
principles of a time value of the money. The section is based mainly on Fabozzi (2010). Money
has different values in time depending on few factors. First thing is the inflation. Prices are
getting higher all the time and the value of the money decreases. The second is the uncertainty
that is attached to the future payment. You cannot be sure that the person you give the money
will  ever pay it back. The person might go bankrupt, make a fraud or even die. Whatever the
7reason there is always a risk of not getting the money back. The uncertainty makes lending risky
and it has to be compensated somehow.
Because of the reasons mentioned above the loans carry interest or some other sorts of fees. A
borrower has to pay a little extra for the lender to get the loan. The interest has to cover the
inflation for the loan period and the risk of not getting the money back. The amount of the
compensation or the interest depends on the agents that take part in the transaction. The
bigger the risk is the higher the interest is. To take an example when you make a deposit to a
bank you actually give a loan to the bank. You get a small interest for it as compensation for the
inflation and for the risk that the bank will go bankrupt  the
bankruptcy very big. On the other hand when you need a loan from the bank you are paying a
higher interest. The bank does not have the same trust in you that you have for the bank.
1.3 Competitiononthecreditmarket
Competition  differs  on  the  credit  market  in  different  areas.  According  to  Petersen  &  Rajan
(1994) the location of a bank determines quite much of the competition. In 90 percent of the
sample  entrepreneurs  takes  loans  from  banks  that  lay  within  15  miles  from  them.  This,
however,  cannot  be generalized into the Finnish consumer loan markets  in  2013,  but  it  gives
one explanation for the different competition environments. According to Petersen & Rajan
there is clear evidence how the level of the competition effects on the loan relationships. If the
credit market is under a perfect competition the loan rates for new entrepreneurs are on a
quite high level and the access to the credit can be limited. At the same time the lenders react
to good payment behavior and reward good debtors with low interest rates. This leads to lower
interest rates for well-known and more riskless borrowers. On the other hand in a more
concentrated credit market a relatively un-known borrower can have access to the credit more
easily and with a lower rate than in the perfect competition. This is possible because the
monopolistic banks have more market power than the banks under perfect competition. They
can lend money under the market rate in order to subsidize young firms on the start and then
 centralized credit markets the lending
rates do not drop very fast. The banks offer higher rates for riskless firms than in the competed
8markets. It seems that the competition limits the new borrowers to get an access for the credit
and makes the profit sharing harder between the banks and the borrowers
In  the  monopolistic  setting  it  is  essential  for  a  bank  to  price  the  loan  so  that  the  borrower
chooses riskless projects that generate profits. If the loan is priced too high it generates a moral
hazard for the debtor. If the return on the riskless project cannot cover the loan expenses then
firm might be forced to take risks in business decisions. The banks market power determines
the upper boundary of the interest rate. The more market power a bank has the more it can
raise the interest rate above the competed market price as long as it does not lead to the moral
hazard. This is essential when setting the initial interest rate for a new and unknown customer
for the first time. After the bank learns to know the borrower it will see whether the firm is
credit worthy or not. The lower limit of the interest rate is evidently set by the banks own cost
structure and funding costs. It is clear that the revenues must cover the expenses in the long
run if the bank wants to stay in the business. So the interest rate will lie between these limits
and as the relationship between the customer and the
will be the leading factor for the rate.
1.4 Marketpowerofbank
Where does the market power of the bank then come from? Berger (1995) has studied this
question by running empirical tests on bank profits against measures of concentration, market
share, managerial efficiency  and scale efficiency. According to the study it seems that the
managerial efficiency in the cost control had positive effects on the profits. Also the relative
market share had positive effect on the profits. On the other hand, when controlling the market
share  the  results  showed  that  the  concentration  had  a  negative  impact  on  the  profits.  So  it
seems that large banks with a large market share and the managerial excellence has a
possibility to use market power and price loans over the market price. Similar results have been
found on De Graeve, De Jonghe and Vennet (2007). They studied the Belgian banking markets
between 1993 and 2002 with a data that covered monthly interest rates for different loan
products. De Graeve et. al. found out that the banks with the largest market shares did actually
price their loans higher than their rivals. According to the results of these studies it seems that
9the biggest banks with a relatively big market share can use the market power in pricing with
differentiated loan products.
1.5 Asymmetricinformation
There are different types of operators in the market. On the other side we have buyers and on
the other side sellers. By the available information the operators make buying and selling
decisions. The buyer considers if he can afford a good and is the good worth of the money. The
seller considers if the price is high enough to cover the production costs and get some profit. If
information is symmetric both the buyer and the seller know all the vital information that has
an effect to the buying or selling decision. As a result we get an effective market where demand
and supply meet with optimal price.
Phrase asymmetric information is used to describe situation where some operators possesses
more information than the others. For example the seller might know that a product has a poor
quality but the buyer does not know it. In a credit market a borrower might know he cannot
pay  the  loan  back  but  a  lender  does  not  know  it.  According  to  Jehle  &  Reny  (2001)  the
asymmetric information typically leads to inefficient market outcome, as decisions of the
operators would be different if all the information was available for all operators. The borrower
or applicant has more information about his financial standing than the bank has. This means
that the bank has to make the lending decision based on an imperfect information. For example
a borrower might be in danger of getting fired and probably cannot pay back the loan. The
borrower has a better knowledge about his financial standing but he might choose not to tell it
to the lender because this would weaken his change of getting the loan. To reduce the
informational asymmetry lender can gather information about borrower to find out how big
risk of default borrower has.
An  adverse  selection  is  one  form  of  how  the  information  asymmetry  occurs.  In  the  credit
markets it basically means that wrong kinds of customers are selected in the lenders loan
portfolio. Lender tries to grant a loan to the good customers that pay back their loan in time.
The real risk quality of a customer can be seen only after the loan is paid back or when payment
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problems begin. The lender does not know it beforehand but he can make prediction based on
the knowledge he has.
The l ehavior to estimate
the default risk of a certain type of applicant. The bank can look similar characteristics among
the good payers and give loan to the people who share these features. The problem here is that
a  lender  has  a  very  limited  sample  of  the  whole  population.  He  knows  only  the  payment
behavior of his own customer pool. That sample might be biased and correlations might not fit
to the whole population. This might lead to situation where the lender s portfolio and lending
decisions suffer from adverse selection that might expose as a higher default risk that was
planned.  It  can have also  very  dramatic  effects  on the lender  who calculates  the price  of  the
loan so that it covers the cost and the risk of the default. If the risk is bigger than believed the
defaulted loans raise the costs for the lender and might in the worst case lead to a bankruptcy
of the lender.
Blöclinger (2005) introduces two kinds of biases that relate to the adverse selection. First is an
-typeandthesecondis -type.  The -typereferstosituationwherelenderassignslowriskontheborrowerbutthedebtresultsindefault.Thisrelatestolowqualityriskidentificationorjustbadluck.The -type error refers to a case where lender assigns high risk
to a borrower when risk in fact is low. When loan is not granted it brings no interest income to
the  lender.  Both  of  these  biases  results  as  adverse  selection  in  lenders  loan  portfolio,  as  he
cannot identify desired borrowers.
The problem of  adverse selection is  very  essential  in  the view of  pricing  the loan.  The lender
assumes a certain risk level to the loan portfolio and prices the loan product according to it. The
price or the interest rate income must cover upcoming credit losses and if there will be more
losses than expected it will soon eat the profits of the portfolio. If a bank cannot make profit it
cannot pay the funding costs and soon it will be in bankruptcy.
Another important form of the asymmetric information is a moral hazard. This concept means
in credit market that borrower will choose not to pay back the loan for some reason. The main
implication would be scenario where borrower sees the cost of paying the loan back higher
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than not paying it. Another implication of moral hazard is that too high interest rate will make
the borrower to take risks that he would not take if the loan contract was better. For example
entrepreneur  might  choose  a  project  with  a  high  risk  to  be  able  to  cover  the  upcoming  loan
payments and this way increase the risk of default.
The lender must try to reduce the information asymmetry as much as possible in order to avoid
the adverse selection and moral hazard. The lender can never know the exact default risk of an
applicant  but  there are  certain  tools  that  can help  the estimation.  To analyze the problem of
information asymmetry in the loan markets I will present a simple model about loan markets.
From that model we see the dynamic that the adverse selection and the moral hazard has
regarding the loan size and the loan sum.
2 TheJaffeeƬRussell-modelaboutloanmarkets
I chose this model for the study because it has characteristics that fit well into the consumer
credit  market.  It  has  no  collateral  assumption  and  it  has  clear  interpretation  about
informational asymmetry. There are many good models about loan markets available but they
usually include the collateral for credit rationing purposes and they also assume that the
lenders are in fact banks that take also deposits. For my purposes the model by Jaffee & Russell
fits better because the Finnish consumer credit market consist many lenders that are not banks.
The funding of the lenders is not coming from the deposits but from the money market and
other sources. The Jaffee & Russell model is also quite simple and relatively easy to
understand.  The  first  disadvantage  of  this  model  is,  however,  that  it  works  in  a  two  period
world and loan product is very simple bullet type loan. In the reality consumer loan contracts
typically run for multiple periods and are somewhat more complicated regarding the pricing
and the calculations. Secondly, it aims on finding single market equilibrium while the market
analysis shows quite large differences in loan prices. The third problem is that it overlooks the
resource differences of the lenders. However, it gives a good understanding of the mechanisms
how information asymmetry effects on the loan contracts. To see other models with different
characteristics  and  complexity  I  would  suggest  Besanko  &  Thakor  (1986)  and  Stigliz  &  Weiss
(1981).
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Jaffee and Russell (1976) present a model about imperfect information in the loan markets. The
model starts from the idea that the borrowers know if they are going to pay back the loan or
not, but the banks do not know it. We can assume that on the market there are two types of
borrowers: honest and dishonest. The honest will take the loan if the interest rate is such that
the loan increases his utility more than the paid interest rate decreases it. If the interest rate is
too high he do not take the loan. The dishonest borrowers will take the loan whenever they
can. They will also pay it back, but only if their utility of paying the loan back is larger than
defaulting the loan. This means that if  the interest is too high the dishonest will  not pay back
the loan because the cost of defaulting is smaller than the loan payment. The lender does not
know which group a borrower belongs. If he would know it the dishonest would not get the
loan.  This  information  asymmetry  creates  a  problem  of  how  to  price  the  loan.  To  avoid  all
defaults the lender should set the price low enough, so that also the dishonest will pay it back.
This might be problematic as the bank has to cover the all  the costs of funding the loan. This
funding price creates a lower boundary for the interest rate. When the interest rate is raised on
higher level there are three effects taking place. First, the gross income per loan will increase
which benefits the lender. Second, the fraction of honest borrowers will start to decline as the
net utility of taking the loan will decrease. This results in the adverse selection and more risky
loan portfolio for the lender. Third, the dishonest will start to default as their net utility turns to
negative while the interest rate grows and we see the moral hazard. This is a somewhat clear
interpretation about how adverse selection and moral hazard works in the loan market.2.1.1 Demand
The  model  is  a  two  period  model  with  multiple  banks  and  borrowers.  The  borrowers  are
divided into two categories: honest and dishonest.  The  banks  do  not  know  the  type  of  a
borrower at the start of the first period. During the first period the borrowers reveal their type
to their own bank by either paying the loan or not paying the now. Other banks do not see the
type. The borrowers are maximizing their utility over two periods. On the first period they can
consume their income  and the loan sum L. On the second period they has the income  but
they can consume only what is left after the loan payment L*R. The honest borrowers are
maximizing their utility function:
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Subject to
Where:
U = total utility
= consumption in period 1
= consumption in period 2
= income in period 1
= income in period 2
R = interest rate factor (1+r)
L = loan amount
We can now insert the budget constraints into the utility function:
By taking the partial derivatives subject to L we get first order condition (FOC):
 total utility is maximized when the utility  in the first period equals the utility
in the second period times the interest rate factor . From this we can now make assumptions
about the loan demand. First we will assume that the income on each period is fixed. After that
we can see that the only things that affect the utility are the loan sum L and the interest rate R.
To satisfy the FOC they must react to each other. The borrower will optimize the loan sum
subject to the interest rate so the loan demand is a function of R.
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To illustrate the demand curve in LR space we can draw Figure 2. On the Y-axis is the interest
rate  R  and  on  the  X-axis  is  the  loan  sum  L.  The  curves , ,  and  illustrate different
indifference curves so that .  They  can  be  drawn  by  giving  constant  utility
levels K for the utility function and calculating different RL combinations that yield K.
On the selected interest rate the borrower will reach the highest utility by increasing the loan
sum L until . On the picture this point is where the utility curve reaches the highest
point and has a zero slope. The loan demand curve is formed by drawing a line that
goes through these points.
Figure 2: Formation of the loan demand curve
The dishonest borrower has same the constraints than the honest in the case he decides to pay
back the loan. In addition to that he also has alternative constraints for the case when he
chooses not to pay and default the loan. So the dishonest borrower has two different constraint
sets:
For the pay back scheme he chooses the consumption levels of:

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And for the default scheme he chooses consumption levels of:
Where variable Z describes the cost of default.
The dishonest borrower will always choose the default scheme if it brings more utility to him.
From the two equations of  follows that the dishonest will choose default scheme if:
Figure 3: Demand for honest and dishonest borrowers
The dishonest borrower chooses not to pay the loan back if his cost of defaulting is smaller than
the cost of paying back the loan and the interest rate attached to it. This is a form of moral
hazard that is created by contract type that encourages dishonest borrower to default the loan.
Figure 3 visualizes the alternative constraint set by adding the default points of the dishonest
borrowers into the same picture with the loan demand of honest borrowers. The
-
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We have now assumed that borrowers are either honest or dishonest type. That would not be
very realistic assumption about the real loan markets. People have different situations in their
life and the default costs are different for individuals. These costs can be economic costs that
will be realized in collection etc. but also reputational or moral costs like getting your name into
a default register or losing your reputation in the eyes of other people or even getting a jail
sentence. Entry to default registry can lead to situation of not getting any loans in the future,
rejection of a credit card or a rental agreement for a flat.
In this model the different default costs can be taken into account by adding a function
This  function  represents  the  fraction  people  who  do  not  default  and  act  honestly  on  a  given
loan contract. It is continuous function of LR. The  = 1 when even the most dishonest
borrower will not default with the given loan sum and interest rate. Function is also declining:
as LR grows the proportion of the people who chooses to pay back the loan decreases. When LR
grows near the infinity  will approach 0. To visualize this we can look the Figure 4. On the Y-
axis  there  is  the  fraction  of  honestly  acting  borrowers  and  on  the  X-axis  there  is  the  loan
contract LR. The  is the point where the loan contract turns into such that part of the
population starts to get higher utility by defaulting the loan than paying it back. When we move
to right on the X-axis we see that the fraction of honestly acting borrowers decreases. When
the loan contract  LR grows the relative  costs  of  defaulting  gets  smaller  and more people  will
choose to default.
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We have assumed that the income streams of the borrowers are fixed. In reality this obviously
is not the case. People face uncertainty for the future incomes and economic situation can
change very fast as result of getting fired or having an injury that prevents individual from
working. It is thus reasonable to think that the borrowers actually optimize their utility over
expected income stream. We can fit this into the model by changing the fixed income  to be
the expected value of the income. This does not change the behavior of the borrowers as they
optimize the consumption over the expected income. The formula  will still be the
fraction of borrowers who pay back the loan because their utility of paying with the realized
income is higher than utility of not paying.
Figure 4: Fraction on borrowers who pay the loan back on loan cotract sizes
2.1.2 Supply
The lender is trying to maximize the value of the loan contracts. To be more accurate he is
maximizing the expected value of the profits because he does not know how big proportion of
the borrowers will actually pay back the loan. In this model lender  the funding cost
of the loan and there is an unlimited supply of funds for the lenders. The profit function of a
lender is form of:
Where
Z min LR
1
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 = profit
L = loan sum
R = interest rate parameter (1+r)
 = fraction of borrowers who do not default at the given loan contract
 = cost of funds for the bank
The first part of the function describes the expected income of the bank. It is the income from
the loan contracts multiplied by the probability of repayment. The lender knows the fraction of
dishonest people in the market but do not know the amount of those in his contract portfolio
at the start of the first period. In the competitive market individual lender s profit must be zero.
By adding that constraint into the function we can produce a credit supply curve:
2.1.3 Thenon-rationingsinglecontractequilibrium
Now we can recall that  = 1 before the point
 will fall and the uncertainty of
payment grows. We can now illustrate the equilibrium in the case of no credit rationing on the
lenders side. On the Figure 5 the demand and the supply curves are presented as inverse
functions of a loan amount. The market rate will find equilibrium at  with loan sum .
The supply curve has some unique features. It is assumed that for the interest rate R = I there is
a maximum loan sum that can be given so that every borrower will pay. This means that the R =
I is so low that all borrowers will pay the loan back until the loan sum reaches a certain level.
The condition R = I can only hold when
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Figure 5: Market equilibrium when no credit rationing is allowed
After the loan sum exceeds the  the proportion of those people who does not pay back the
loan starts to grow from zero. This will cause the interest rate to increase because otherwise
lender s profit would turn to negative. After that point the shape of the supply curve is
dependent on  has the
Pareto distribution without a distributi  is distributed
exponentially the slope will be backwards bending. Like Jaffee and Russell I am presenting here
the backward bending model. It illustrates the situation where lenders do actually decrease the
loan sum provided if the interest rate is growing over certain point. This might actually be true
in real world as the adverse selection and moral hazard are increasing when interest rate is
high. Lenders can see that if interest rate is too high the loan contracts will become more and
more risky. This choice should not, however, have effects on the main results of the model.
There exists an equilibrium point  where supply curve meets the demand curve with
non-profit constraint for lender. From the equilibrium we can see that when the lender cannot
 
[L]
I
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identify the risk of a borrower he must raise the lending rate for all the borrowers. This means
that the honest borrowers will pay higher interest rate than they should and compensate the
costs that the dishonest borrowers are causing for the lender. From the individual lender  side
this is also problematic as he cannot know the type of a borrower when he is giving the loan. If
lender happens to give the loan only for the dishonest people it will be end for his business as
larger fraction of the borrowers will default on him.
Next I will go through the model extension for the case of credit rationing in which we look at
the situation where lender will have the change to try to identify the risk of the borrower.2.1.4 Rationingequilibriumswithsinglecontractandmultiplecontracts
On the previous equilibrium there was a single interest rate for all the borrowers and it was
found from the crossing point of the demand and the supply. However, on the real loan market
people see different interest rates and banks try to find ways to figure out the risk that is
attached  to  the  borrowers.  We  can  look  this  kind  of  situation  also  in  the  Jaffee  &  Russell
model in the Figure 6 loan contracts that locate below
the demand curve and that the zero profit condition holds. On the non-rationing equilibrium S
borrowers have the utility .  The honest  borrowers  are  now compensating the lenders  with
higher interest because the defaults the dishonest borrowers are causing. We can easily see
that the honest borrowers would actually prefer any rationing contract under the  curve as
these contracts would yield them more utility.  On the Figure 6 the line TS illustrates the part of
the supply curve where the loan size exceeds point  and some of the dishonest people will
start  to  default.  Now,  if  lender  could  identify  a  borrower  who  is  paying  back  the  loan  with
contract S he could offer better contract E that locates on the supply curve and which borrower
would prefer. The lender would not have to worry about the defaults because a borrower who
is honest at contract S is also honest for all the better contracts he can get for loan sums that
are smaller than in the S.
Next we can look all the different contracts a lender can offer if the credit rationing is possible.
For the lender the supply curve ITS shows the lower limit for the contracts he can offer. Under
that line all the contracts would be un-profitable for the lender because defaults will exceed the
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revenue. The upper limit for the possible contracts is the iso-utility curve  that runs through
the non-rationing equilibrium S. Above that line borrower's utility would suffer and he would
rather  choose  the  contract  S.  Between  these  limits,  the  lender  can  offer  any  contract  to  the
honest borrower and the contract will be accepted. The lender can offer contract E  to the
honest borrower and this actually benefits both agents. The borrower gets better utility
compared to S and the lender will receive extra profits as he operates over the supply curve.
However, if the market works properly and the non-profit constraint holds then the
competition will run the rationing equilibrium to the point E where the utility of the honest
borrowers will be maximized and no extra profits will go to the lender.
Figure 6: Market equilibrium when credit rationing is allowed
It  is also possible that some lenders can offer contracts that are on the area HEF. This can be
possible because the dishonest borrowers will always choose the larger contract. They are not
going to pay it back so why take the smaller sum? On the other hand, for the honest borrowers
these contracts give higher utility. Thus, the honest borrowers will be over time self-selected to
this  better  contract  and  only  the  dishonest  will  be  on  the  contract  E.  This  will  lead  to  the
situation that only the dishonest will take the contract E and the lenders that offer it will go
bankrupt as all borrowers default. Now, the only contract that is on the market will be the H on
E
S
Demand [L]
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I
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the area HEF and also the dishonest borrowers has to take that offer. At this situation supply
must again move to the point E so that the non-profit condition holds.
In reality the market might not be perfectly competed. The lenders try to identify the risk that is
attached to a borrower and manages in that task differently. On the other hand, all borrowers
might not compare the prices to find the cheapest one. This gives interesting point to look for a
lender s profit generation. The lender can get advantage against competitors if he can identify
borrower s risk better than others. If the market price is on the  non-rationing equilibrium S and
one lender can identify an honest borrower that is seen risky or dishonest by the other lenders,
he  can  offer  rationing  contract  that  is  marked  to  the  picture  by  E
extract extra profits from the loan contract and actually benefit the borrower as well. As we
saw earlier the contract E  gives higher utility for the honest borrower if compared to S. Even in
the well competed markets these situations can occur for a short time before the market will
make the corrections. The same thing applies to the area under the supply curve. If lender can
identify the risk of the borrower better than competitors he can extract profits from his own
portfolio that is better in quality.
Next I will go through some recent research on the area of pricing to show that assumptions
about shapes of the demand and the supply curves hold in real world as well.
3 Pricing
Pricing of the lending rate within a bank is mainly attached to three aspects: Cost of funding,
managerial efficiency and risk. The cost of funding is mainly attached to the market rate for the
short and the long money. According to Freixas and Rochet (1997) the market rates were the
main drivers for the cost of funding and the deposit rates had no real effect. This follows the
the interbank market. In the recent banking crisis this might not hold anymore as confidence
between banks has become weaker. In the Jaffee & Russell model was assumed that the only
cost would be the funding cost. We can extend the model and assume that the funding cost
includes also all the other relevant cost. Individual lender might diverge from the average costs
by operational excellence against others. However, the competition will drive the other lenders
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to improve their cost structure so that they can match the prices of the better lenders or they
will go bankrupt as honest borrowers will disappear from their portfolio.
3.1 Loansizeanditseffectsonprice
The effect of the loan size to the price of the loan has been noted already early in the literature.
There is  also  empirical  study to  back up the assumption made in  the Jaffee & Russell  -model
about the declining demand function. Already in the 1964 George J. Benston studied this topic
and  found  clear  correlation  between  the  loan  size  and  the  pricing.  He  noted  that  banks  give
lower rate for a larger loan and higher rate for a smaller loan. According to Benston there were
two explaining factors. First was the managerial cost per dollar for different the loan sums.
Benston found out that the managerial cost per dollar was lower for larger loan than for smaller
loan. This makes sense because it can be assumed that a loan process is the same for each loan
in the same loan type despite of the loan amount. Further, if the process is the same and costs
are similar then the administration cost for dollar is lower for bigger loans. The second
explanation for the price difference is that banks are discriminating against smaller borrowers.
In this point of view it must be stated that smaller loan applicants have more limited access to
the credit and banks have thus more negotiating power. Large borrowers have to qualify better
in the application process because the credit risk that bank faces is bigger for the larger sums. It
is also common to give collaterals for the loan as the loan size grows. Thus, it can be assumed
that the larger borrowers are considered to have better quality in risk terms or at least they
have to clear tighter lending policy in the applications process. This hypothesis is backed up also
hen money supply is tighter the small borrowers face
relatively bigger rise in loan rates than the large borrowers.
3.1 Priceelasticity
The formula for price elasticity of demand is:

Price elasticity measures how much demand change if price is changed. More accurately, it
shows how many percent demand changes if price increases with one percent.
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A recent study has found somewhat different results regarding the size of the price elasticity of
consumer credit. Gross and Souleles (2002) made a research of the price elasticity of credit card
markets in the U.S. They studied about how much the credit card balances reacted for the price
changes during the contract. They found that the price elasticity was on the average -1,3. The
elasticity was highest for balances near the credit limit and another finding was that the
elasticity was higher for the price decreases than for the price increases. A credit card contract
is,  however,  little  bit  different  than a  fixed loan contract.  If  people  have different  credit  card
limits it is relatively easy just to transfer the balance from one card to another when they have
different prices. Still, according to Gross & Souleles under half of the elasticity was explained by
the balance transfer.
Another study about the price elasticity was made by Karlan and Zinman (2006) in South Africa.
They studied the price elasticity of microloans by sending offers to borrowers who had been
earlier customers of the bank. They found out that the price elasticity was an average -0,3 and
all observations were under -0,5. The elasticity was higher for those borrowers that were
known  to  be  less  risky  and  the  poorer  ones  did  not  react  so  much  on  the  price.  This  makes
sense in  the way that  people  with  more stable  economical  standing do not  need the loan so
much and has thus more negotiation power against banks.
The results are in line with the demand curve of Jaffee & Russell model. The study of price
elasticity of demand in consumer credit market shows that the demand curve is downward
sloping.  The size of the elasticity differs in these two researches presented, but also the
products and markets differ from each other. There were also some other differences. Karlan &
Zinman showed that the demand was more sensitive for the price increases and on the study of
Gross & Souleles the demand was more sensitive for the price decreases. This might be linked
to the market environment or the fact that people react differently on the price of loans they
already have. Either way, this discussion will be left for further study.
3.2 Riskbasedpricing
The risk based pricing is a form of a price differentiation. The idea is to recognize borro
risk  profile  already  in  the  application  phase  and  set  the  price  of  the  loan  according  to  it.  So,
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lender will set a higher price for a loan if the credit risk seems high and a lower price if the risk
seems low. In consumer credit market this pricing phenomenon has become more common
 the risk based pricing has
been used increasingly in the consumer loan market after the early
increase in the interest rate spreads between different borrowers in securitized loans.
However, among the un-securitized loans only the credit card interest rate spreads rose while
in the student loans and other consumer loans the spreads remained stable. Edelberg showed
also that price changes did have effects into the loan demand. While the whole amount of
credit  rose  in  the  observation  period  the  increase  and  the  benefits  did  not  fall  on  every  risk
class uniformly. Firstly, the risk based price discrimination had benefits for the low risk
borrowers as their interest rates fell. The data shows that this population increased their total
lending during the observation period. Secondly, the highest risk population benefitted for a
better access to the credit. Although their interest rates were relatively high they could actually
get a loan as opposed to before. Thirdly, the moderately high risk population observed
relatively higher interest rates than before and they did change their borrowing patterns. This
showed a decline in credit amount among this population. It seems that the middle class of
borrowers suffered of the risk based pricing through higher cost of credit. While risk based
pricing has positive effects for some borrowers everybody does not win. Part of the increased
credit risk was channeled to the marginal of the middle class of the borrowers.
The observations of risk evaluation and risk based pricing are suggesting that there exists credit
rationing in the credit markets and there are different loan contracts offered to the borrowers.
This means that the lenders can evaluate the risk of borrowers while some information
asymmetry still exists. Lenders can identify the default costs roughly and price the
loan so that the most of the honest borrowers gain for the contracts but the middle risk
borrowers has to pay compensation for defaults.
4 Evaluationoftheborrower defaultrisk
In this chapter I go briefly through history of credit risk modeling. I will introduce two main
tools that are used to reduce a  the information
26
sharing systems and the scoring models. Both of these are used to back up the lending
decisions and to ion. It seems
that an effective automated identification of default risk can be done and it has positive effects
for lenders profits. To look more into this see for example Blöchlinger (2005). The Information
sharing  has  shown  to  have  multiple  positive  effects  not  only  for  the  lender  but  also  for  the
borrower and the whole  credit  market.  After  the information sharing and credit  scoring I  will
discuss how they can be inserted into the Jaffee & Russell model. I will also show the dynamics
they have on the supply curve and the equilibrium points.
4.1 Informationsharing
To reduce the information asymmetry there have been created information sharing systems in
the majority of the countries according to two major researches made in last ten years (Jappelli
and Pagano 2005, Miller 2003.) These researchers discovered considerable variation in the
threshold of filing a credit report. In some countries already the loan exposure was enough for
personal credit report that could be checked by other lenders. In other countries only the
default was registered. A lender can ask for borrower s credit report from the credit bureaus
that hold the register to find out if the borrower has over indebted or has a bad payment
history.
Recent research has showed that information sharing has many positive effects on the markets.
I will introduce four positive impacts that have been found:
1. Reduction of the adverse selection as lenders knowledge of borrower improves
2. Reduction of the  extract from customers
3. Enhanced borrower discipline by cutting insolvent debtors off from the credit
4. Reduction of over indebting by drawing many simultaneous credits from different
lenders
Jappelli and Pagano (1993) studied these impacts of the information sharing. In their model
each bank knows the behavior of their local borrowers but behavior of non-local borrowers is
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unknown. The adverse selection is thus higher with the non-local borrowers because of the lack
of  information.  By  sharing  their  knowledge  with  the  other  lenders  banks  can  reduce  the
information asymmetry and thus also adverse selection. As banks can lend more to safer
customers it will enhance its credit portfolio quality. The lender can lower the risk premiums as
cost of asymmetric information reduces, which will eventually result as smaller interest rates to
the borrower. Padilla and Pagano (2000) argued that the information sharing also enhances the
borrower discipline. While the lenders share the information, the borrowers in the default
register will be facing higher rates as a penalty for bad payment performance. A borrower will
try to avoid this and exerts more effort to the loan payments. The fourth part can be achieved
only in limited case where the lenders share the outstanding loan exposure in a positive loan
register.
In Finland the leading credit information sharing platform is the Suomen Asiakastieto register
according to The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority. It is a public register where
er holds information about type and
amount of the defaulted loans, the bankruptcies and the official loan arrangements. Lenders
can also report a notice if borrower  payments are delayed enough. In big part of the EU there
is a positive loan register on markets. According to Rothemund & Gerhardt (2011) credit
bureaus of 18 member countries actually hold a positive register that contain all the loans that
individual consumers hold. The negative registry which contains only the default markings was
even more common and 23 nations stated that they hold negative information.
In my field study I noticed that while there is a negative payment registry for all lenders there is
also positive registry that part of the lenders use.  While the negative registry is mandatory for
operators  the  positive  registry  is  voluntary.  A  lender  has  to  ask  from  the  borrower  if  he  is
approving that lender will use this register and check borrower s information from the registry.
The registry contains information about following variables:
Count of outstanding loans
Loan sums
Size of loan payments
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Sum of loan payments on due
On 23.4.2013 there are 15 lenders that use the register. While this register is only couple of
months old it is quite interesting that the whole lending industry is not choosing to join in it as
it evidently brings more information about borrowers. One reason might be that the registry is
voluntary on
permission to the lender. This can be easily be interpreted as a sign of some negative
information but it can also mean that the borrower is simply not comfortable of sharing
information  of  his  loans  to  anyone.   Another  reason  might  that  at  least  the  large  banks  that
hold large customer portfolios want to keep the knowledge about their own customers by
themself.
4.2 Creditscoring
when credit cards were introduced in the
US. The amount of credit card applications forced the issuers to develop a standardized form
for credit decisions. Until that individual experts made the lending decisions. They considered
ding to make the lending decision based on their professional opinion.
 became so large that
there was no other change but to automate the lending decisions. This was proved to be an
effective way to drop the default rate. Churchill, Nevin and Watson (1977) showed that this
process automation reduced the credit defaults at least 50% comparing to the individual
judgment of applicants. Also Rosenberg and Gleit (1994) found out that credit experts produced
somewhat less accurate risk classifications than the statistical methods.
Since the credit scoring had brought good results in the credit card markets, banks started to
use them in other products as well. At first the scoring was implemented to the personal loans
and more recently to the mortgages and small business loans (Thomas 2000).
Basically the credit scoring means estimation of a  behavior by some statistical
analysis.  The credit scoring is used to estimate the default risk of the customer, based on the
application information. Thus, the information that is gathered about a customer should be
useful considering the loan decision. The lender has the application information, the
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information held by credit reference agencies and recent payment history in case of an old
customer (Thomas 2000.) In addition to these the lender also has a mass of information of the
previous applicants and their payment behavior.
The idea of a credit scoring system is to find different factors that are considered to
 the
information gathered about the borrower. After the scores have been calculated the lender can
put borrowers in order based on the credit score. On the bottom there are the applicants with
the lowest scores and on top the applicants with the highest scores.
To see what kind of information is used in the credit scoring models I will introduce one basic
model that is presented by Kainulainen (2004). This model is Suomen Asiakasti
Credit  and  it  is  designed  for  the  Finnish  credit  markets.  The  model  is  based  on  a  logistic
regression analysis and it contains eight variables that are considered to predict the default risk:
1. Age
2. Profession
3. Income
4. Residential status
5. Gender
6. Geographical location
7. Marital status
8. Length of current employment
Different values of these variables are given certain scores and the sum of these scores will give
the overall credit score of the applicant. This is a basic model that can be programmed to match
different companies  needs (Kainulainen 2004.) In this model every variable is divided in
into groups of 18-25, 26-40, 41-60 and
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60-. Now, to each of these segments the lender attaches a certain score. For example one point
if the age is 18-25, two points if the age is 26-40 and so on. This is done to all the variables and
a customer will have an
from all variables are counted the lender knows applicants total score. If the applicant gets
enough points he will get the loan. The minimum score for a positive loan decision is called a
cut off rate. The cut off rate demonstrates how tight the loan policy is in a lending firm. If the
firm likes to get a small but well performing loan portfolio it raises the cut off rate so that only a
small  fraction  appliers  will  get  the  loan.  If  the  firm  wants  to  make  business  with  more  risky
borrowers and have a large loan portfolio it will lower the cut off rate (Blöchlinger 2005).
Table 1: The example scorecard from Rosenberg and Gleit (1994)
The Table 1 shows one kind of scorecard that is presented by Rosenborg and Gleit (1994). From
that can be seen the different scores that are attached to the different variable values. From
each row the applicant will get a certain amount of points according to his individual attributes.
The applicant will be scored by counting all points from the rows together.
By a statistical analysis the lender can search similarities in the group of the defaulters.
According to Thomas the lending organizations usually have a record of hundreds of thousands
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or even millions of loans.  the application information
and the payment performance. From this data it is possible to find factors that seem to have an
effect  to  the  individual  credit  risk.  As  the  relevant  factors  are  identified  they  can  be
implemented into the loan decision process. This gives an idea of how the scorecards are
developed.
The scoring models can be divided into two different types which can be used for lending
decisions: Credit scoring models and behavior scoring models. These are used in two different
situations. The credit scoring models are used when lender makes a credit decision to a new
customer while behavior-scoring models are used in the case of an old customer. So the credit
scoring models work with application information and the behavior scoring models work with
known payment behavior of the customer.
There are many different scoring models in the market but the basic idea is the same in all: find
the factors that correlate with the defaults and make the lending decisions based on that
information.
4.3 Methodsusedtocreatecreditscoringmodel
In the economic literature multiple different scoring models have been introduced. These can
be divided into two groups that are a discriminant analysis and operational research methods.
The discriminant analysis contains linear regression models, logistic regression models and
classification trees. According to Thomas (2000) the operational research methods are mainly
based on linear programming. In addition to these there are also some other methods based on
d in
business  scoring  and  not  in  customer  loans  (Altman  et.  al  1994).  The  most  common  and  the
most studied models seem to be the discriminant analysis based regression models (Thomas
2000).
The basic idea of the discriminant analysis is that in the borrower population are two groups: G
and B. G stands for a good customer who pays back the loan with no problems. Group B on the
other hand consist of bad customers that do not pay the loan back. The groups can be studied
to find similarities that could predict some sort of behavior. By making a regression analysis a
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lender can now try to find similar features that defaulters have and similarities that good
customers have. The lender tries to answer to questions like: Does the age have an impact to
the customer  behavior?  Does  income  class  or  marital  status  have  correlation  to
default risk? When some explanatory variables are found the scorecard is built on these. The
regression might be linear or logistic, but the idea remains the same (Rosenberg and Gleit
1994).
The aim of regression models is to find the right variables that correlate with default risk but
not with each other. Then the weight of a certain variable leads to a probability that applicant
with this variable belongs to group G. This gives us a score function of a basic linear regression
where w stands for the weight and x stand for the variable value:
s(x) w0 w1x1 w2x2 ... wmxm
As the relevant variables have been found and scorecard have been designed the lender has to
set the cutoff rate. In order to do so, the lender will calculate how much losses an average bad
customer produces. By comparing this to how much a good customers gives profit the lender
can optimize the profits with respect to the risk rate.
Figure 8: The decision tree from Rosenberg and Geit (1994).
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Another discriminant scoring model is the decision tree that is presented in the Figure 8. The
decision tree is based on an idea that first you find out which variable discriminates the most G
from B. After this you divide the population into two groups according the variable. Next, you
find out which is the second best variable for discrimination. Now continue to discriminate the
two groups into smaller groups.  After few rounds you have many different groups that have
different risk attached to them (see Figure 8). The lending decision can be based on the
comparison of the end node s default probability and the chosen risk level.
The Table 2 gathers rent rows
cannot be compared straight as the research methods have varied between authors (Thomas
2000). From the table we can see that there is not much of variation between different models.
It seems that whatever the scoring model is it gives quite similar assumptions about the default
risk within a certain study. Linear programming, neural nets and GA have not been studied as
much as others and they also show a little bit worse accuracy than regression models.
Table 2: Comparison of accuracy of different scoring models from Thomas (2000)
In a more recent study of different scoring models (Heiat 2012) the accuracies of the models set
between 75 % and 89 %.  In  this  study all  models  has  an acceptable  level  of  accuracy  but  the
SVM-model is clearly the most accurate. The SVM was able to predict quite correctly good
credit out of the bad.
Authors Linear reg Logistic reg RPA LP Neural nets GA
Henley (1995) 43.4 43.3 43.8
Boyle et al. (1992) 77.5 75 74.7
Srinivasan and Kim (1987a,b) 87.5 89.3 93.2 86.1
Yobas et al. (1997) 68.4 62.3 62.0 64.5
Desai et al. (1997) 66.5 67.3 67.3 6.4
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From these studies we can see that the scoring method is not standard for all operators. There
are multiple different scoring methods that yield different accuracy on prediction power.
Lender can develop his scoring continuously to gain advantage against competitors.
Table 3: Comparison of accuracy of different scoring models from Heiat (2012)
SVM C5
Bayesian
Network
C&R
Tree CHAID
Logistic
Regression
Neural
Net
Overall
accuracy 88.769 83.231 78.462 77.692 76 75.846 75.231
Lift (Top 30%) 1.771 1.655 1.667 1.59 1.631 1.581 1.657
The credit scoring depends on the information that is gathered partly from the registries but big
part of it is asked straight from the applicant. While the registries have quite limited
information about the consumers the lender has to depend on the application information that
cannot be verified at all or the verification is difficult and costly. In Finland the credit registries
contain information about negative payment remarks which is of course very valuable
information. On the other hand the lender will have no exact information about the
total loan exposure or the liquidity which the positive registry would offer. Lender can however
inquire the tax decision documents or pay slips from the applicant. The tax decision contains
information about loan exposure, interests and income from the previous year. The problem is
that tax decisions are mailed to consumers approximately six months after a year has ended so
the information is not current but from 6 to 18 months out of date. Every document that the
lender  requires  from  applicant  makes  the  process  more  difficult  to  borrower  so  the  risk  of
losing a customer grows.
4.4 ApplicationsofinformationsharingandcreditscoringintheJaffeeƬ
Russell model
In  this  section  I  am  developing  the  Jaffee  and  Russell model further to show effects the
information sharing and the credit scoring have in this frame. First I present these two
information tools and then show the effects on the equilibrium.
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4.4.1 Informationsharing
The amount of the information influences the quality of the risk predictions lender can make.
Thus it can be assumed that an access to a loan register benefits the lender. The negative credit
register  is  mandatory  for  all  the lenders  in  Finland so this  does  not  have effects  on supply  in
Jaffee & Russell model but affects the pool of applicants. It can be stated that the negative
payment information is known to all lenders and the borrowers with negative payment remark
are ruled out from the market. The voluntary credit register on the other hand does have
implications on the model. The lenders that belong in the register have better knowledge about
ituation than those lenders who do not belong in the
register. At the same time they must share the information about their own customers to those
lenders who also belong in the register. In the Jaffee & Russell model it was assumed that all
lenders know the fraction of good payers in the total population but the positive register alters
this situation if all lenders do not have the access to the register. I will assume that the access
must cost something to the lender and it must be taken in to account in the model. To do this, I
insert two new variables A[ ] and  in the supply function. The A[ ] describes benefit that a
lender gains for the access to the register. It gets value A=1 if lender does not belong to the
register and constant value A>1 if he belong to it. The variable  describes the cost of access to
register. The supply function of a lender then has the following form:
4.4.2 Creditscoring
I have now shown the principles of credit scoring and how it is used. It seems apparent that the
credit scoring can lower the informational asymmetry that lender faces and can produce
competitive advantage for a lender if he can get better risk predictions out of the scoring
process. Similarly than the information sharing this should be taken in to consideration in Jaffee
& Russell -model. The credit scoring can improve the lenders portfolio but at the same time the
development of such system might be expensive. We can add two variables in the supply
function to illustrate this. The variable is describing the positive effect of getting better
fraction of good borrowers and  describes the cost of the scoring system. It can be further
assumed that is growing in .  These  scoring  variables  do  not  have  effects  on  the
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demand function as the variables are only affected by lenders choices. The supply function
would then be in the following form:
4.4.3 Effectsfortheequilibrium
Both the positive loan registry and the credit scoring affects the credit supply similarly. They
increase the lenders cost but at the same time they make lender s business more profitable.
The lender can identify better the borrower s default cost. When the default costs are known to
the lender he can give the loan only to the honestly acting borrowers on the given price. We
can thus handle both of these with the same variable. A variable X will demonstrate the amount
of information and the variable I which  was  the  funding  cost  of  the  lender  will  be  seen  as  a
function of X. Also the fraction of the honestly acting borrowers is now presented as a function
of X. The information cost could be handled separately from the funding cost like I presented
them in 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 but this would make the model more complex. Lenders profit function
is now:
Where:
 = profit
L = loan sum
R = interest rate
X = the information level a lender acquires with information tools.
And the supply curve will be:
There are now two effects happening in the supply curve if we compare the situation on
original Jaffee & Russell -model: the cost effect and the portfolio effect. If a lender earns more
by investing in better information about the customer s  default  risk,  he  will  do  it.  The
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information level I[X] is set by investments X. This cost effect will push the supply curve
upwards in the RL-space as I[X=0] < I[X>0]. This will also lift the equilibrium price. The Figure 9 is
showing this effect.
Figure 9: The cost effect of information purchase
The portfolio effect comes from the assumption that a lender can make better loan decisions if
he has more information. The lender can identify better fraction of honestly acting borrowers
and can offer better contracts to them. When the lender can acquire better performing loan
portfolio it will bend the supply curve downwards from that point on where the dishonest
people will start to default depending on their default cost. This is presented in the Figure 10.
The lender can now identify borrower s risk better and offer the loan contracts only to those
borrowers whose default costs are higher than the loan payment.
When the supply curve is bending down it also brings the equilibrium rate down. The total
change in the equilibrium price depends on these two effects. It can increase it or decrease it
depending on the size of the information cost and the portfolio effect. However, regarding to
the literature I have presented earlier it can be assumed that the total effect brings the
equilibrium price down and benefit the honestly acting borrower.
I[X=0]
I[X>0
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Figure 10: The portfolio effect of the information purchase
5 ConsumercreditmarketinFinland
It this section I will go through some key numbers about the Finnish consumer credit market. I
will focus mainly on a consumer credit excluding mortgages. Numbers are based on two
authority references. First one is Annual Review 2012 of Financial Statistics of Finland published
by Bank of Finland. This publication shows figures regarding the firms that are operating under
banking license. The banking license is needed if a firm is taking deposits so the review does not
take into account finance companies that finance their operations via other sources. The
second reference is a database of Statistics Finland which gathers statistics from the banks but
also from the finance companies. The Statistics Finland database is collected via surveys from
the banks and the finance companies. The statistics can be considered quite comprehensive as
the financial companies are obliged to provide needed data to the Statistics Finland according
to Finnish law (Tilastolaki 280/2004).
I[X=0]
I[X>0]
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5.1 Differentproducts
In the Finnish consumer credit market the main products are credit card type of loans and fixed
loans. The credit cards are having a certain loan limit that a borrower has and he can use that
limit over and over again by paying the loan back in between. This means that the borrower has
access to a continuous credit limit with only one application. The fixed loan, on the other hand,
have a single contract for a certain loan sum and if the borrower wants a new loan after the
original loan is paid back he has to make a new application. The fixed loans can be divided into
two categories depending on whether the contract has collateral attached or not. The largest
loans usually have collateral attached to them to cover some of the default risk the lender is
facing. The smaller loan sums might not need collateral and lenders are preparing for the
defaults with pricing decisions. The uncollateralized loans can be divided further into two
categories depending on the loan sum. The larger consumption loans range from 2000 euros
upwards and the small loans are under 2000. In the larger consumption loans the payment
plans might be couple of years while the small loans are usually paid off with one payment few
months after the loan is granted. I study the fixed and uncollateralized loan markets for larger
sums so the other products are getting less attention. However, while legislation concerning
the small loans is changing in the near future which will have substantial effects on that market
I will cover some features of it because it has very similar characteristics than in the loan
product used in the Russell & Jaffee model.5.1.1 Smallconsumerloans
During  the  last  10  years  Finland  has  seen  increasing  market  for  the  small  loans  and  pay  day
loans. Statistics Finland characterizes these loans to be relatively small in sum and have
maturity of maximum three months. These loans usually carry no nominal interest but other
costs related to these are relatively high. According to Statistics Finland the small debt
companies have been granting loans for 394 million euros in 2012. However, this business is
going to face serious problems in the future as the Finnish government has been proposed
some restrictions regarding the pricing of this kind of loan products. In government
HE 78/2012 it is stated that unsecured loans with principal less than 2000 euros will get a rate-
cap of 50% + reference rate (1% at 29.3.2013). The rate cap concerns the effective yearly
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interest  rate  which  includes  both  the  interest  rate  and  all  other  costs  that  follow  the  loan
contract. This is quite remarkable change as now these effective yearly interest rates in the
small loans are averaging in phenomenal 920 % (Statistics Finland).
This kind of product would partly fit quite well into the Jaffee & Russell model. The product is
very  simple.  There  is  one  sum  that  is  borrowed  and  it  is  paid  back  with  certain  interest  rate
factor. The loan contracts must be based on some simple estimation of the fraction of honest
borrowers in the total population, because the lending decisions are made on very thin
information. These are two period products and the possible risk will be realized to the lender
in the second period. This part of the market is not near the non-rationing equilibrium because
these loan products have very high interest attached to them. Further, they do demonstrate
well that in the real credit market must be credit rationing and multiple equilibriums. The loan
prices differs a lot in Finland and if we look all the consumer credit products it is easy to assume
that  on  the  high  interest  rates  the  defaults  are  also  on  high  level.  In  the  Finnish  small  loan
markets lenders can face over 30 % defaults of the given loan contracts (Hörkkö 2010). It can be
assumed that the high interest rate is ruling out big part of the honest borrowers and the costs
of defaulting that kind of loan is not that big for the defaulters.
However, this loan product is not that interesting now when the new legislation is altering the
market environment in the near future. Suomen pienlaina yhdistys Ry, which can be considered
as the parent organization for small debt companies, published 28.3.2013 an announcement in
which it states that the organization will close down after the new legislation will come into
effect in June 2013. This will  mean that this specific market will  shrink substantially.  It  will  be
seen in the future how this effect the demand of other kind of consumer loan products.
According to Statistics Finland the loan stock of small debts in Finland was 134 million euro in
small  compared to  the whole  consumer loan market  as  the small  debt  stock  is  less  than two
percent of the uncollateralized consumer loans.
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5.1.2 Largeconsumerloans
According to my study the large consumer loans are usually based on an annuity calculation
and it has a certain fixed monthly payment until the whole loan sum is paid. In this section I am
presenting the basic characteristic of the consumption loans.
In the loan contract is stated following relevant variables for calculations:
1. the loan amount
2. starting time
3. running time (approximate)
4. monthly annuity payment sum
5. payment interval
6. loan costs
7. reference rate of interest
8. interest rate marginal
The loan amount is from 2000 to 50000 and an applicant can choose preferred sum from that
range. However, the applicant must clear high enough credit score for each sum available.  So,
the higher sum applicant wants the better score he must have in the application phase.
The starting point is the day when contract is made or the day when the money is wired to the
borrower and from that day on the interest starts to accumulate. The payment interval is
basically always one month. Each month borrower receives invoice that includes installment,
monthly interest and monthly fee. The payment is calculated according to the annuity and the
monthly sum is fixed for the whole running time. The loan interest is tied to a reference rate
which is currently most often the 3 month euribor and the reference rate is updated once a
year. The interest is calculated on a daily basis for the declining principle and invoiced every
moth. This gives some unique characters for the running time. Because the interest rate is
floating the running time is not known when the loan contract is made. This is due to the fact
that while the monthly payment is fixed and the interest rate is floating the running time will
rise if reference rate will grow. To make it simpler, when the interest rate increases a bigger
proportion of the fixed monthly payment is used to cover the interest. This leads to smaller
installments to the principal which in turn extends the running time. After each time the
42
interest has been updated the payment plan will be simulated to match the new interest rate
and agreed annuity payment.
5.2 MarketinFinland
 the Finnish consumer
credit  stock  has  grown  4  %  to  13  billion  euros  in  the  banking  sector.  The  growth  has  been
slightly  faster  than the year  before.  About  one third  of  these 13 billion were uncollateralized
credit  card  loans  or  revolving  loans  and  two  thirds  were  fixed  loans.  60  %  out  of  these  fixed
loans were tied to collateral and 40 % were without collateral. This gives 4,3 billion markets for
credit cards or similar products, 3,5 billion market for uncollateralized fixed loans and 5,2 billion
markets for fixed loans carrying collateral.
Figure 9: The amount of household consumer credit and average interest rates over time. From Finlands Bank.
Financial Statistics  Annual Review 2012
The  average  interest  rate  for  credit  card  loans  was  a  bit  under  9%.  In  the  fixed  loans  the
average interest rate was 3,7 %. The difference might be due to fact that 60% of the fixed loans
had collateral. The drop of market rates for money has not been channeled to consumers in the
un-collateralized loan products as the banks have been raising marginal at the same time. The
consumers have actually been facing similar rates than the year before.
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As said before, the finance companies that operate only on market based money or some other
types of financing are not under the bank surveillance.  Approximately a bit over 10 % of total
consumer loans were given by this kind of financing firms that do not hold banking license.
More  accurately  at  the  end  of  2012  the  consumer  credit  portfolio  of  financing  firms  was  1,7
billion euros according Suomen Tilastokeskus. This will give us total 14,7 billion euros for the
total consumer credit portfolio in Finland. No statistics were available about how this sum was
divided between credit cards, fixed loans with collateral and fixed loans without collateral. If we
assume that the shares are similar than with the banks the division would be 567 million in
credit cards, 680 million in fixed loans with collateral and 453 million in fixed loans without
collateral. This will leave us with total consumer credit stock that is divided as in Table 5: Credit
cards or revolving loan 4,9 billion euro, fixed loan with collateral 5,9 billion euro and fixed loan
without collateral 3,9 billion euro.
Table 5: Market size of the different loan types in Finland
Loan type Banks Finance companies * Total
Credit card/ revolving loan 4333 567 4900
Fixed with collateral 5200 680 5880
Fixed with no collateral 3467 453 3920
Total 13000 1700 14700
unit = million
* division estimated to be similar to banks
5.3 Competitionanalysis
The Finnish loan markets consist of two kinds of lenders: banks and financing companies. I have
gathered  pricing  information  about  lenders  who  give  loans  over  2000  euros.  The  pricing
information is collected from websites of the lenders and there is a serious shortage in the
information mainly considering banks but also the finance companies. Most of the banks do not
give the pricing information in advance and the rates are tailored for each borrower. Reason for
this  might  be  that  the  Finnish  bank  industry  is  led  by  a  few  large  banks.  They  have  large
customer base and they might limit the uncollateralized consumer loans mainly to their existing
customers. Banks hold extensive information about their customers because they administer
also the  the borrowers  economic situation.
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Also most of the financing companies give the final rate after the application. However, the rate
gaps (min  max) were informed by many of the players and they give interesting results. I also
collected information about the costs lenders charge on top of the actual interest rate. As a
conclusion it can be said that the price differences seem very large and the pricing in itself is
made hard to understand. The comparison between loans is difficult and it is apparent that
market works through price differentiation depending on loan sums and/or risk predictions.
The comparison could be made optimally with the effective annual interest rate that considers
also all the loan costs but this information was not available for fixed loan sums. Thus, I present
the rate gaps the lenders are informing.
Table 6 is showing the pricing information of the lenders that offer uncollateralized consumer
loan over 2000 euros. On the market there are currently 17 lenders of which 8 are banks and 9
are  financing  companies.  Most  of  the  lenders  give  the  actual  rate  only  after  the  loan  is
approved. The loan sums start from 2000 and are at highest 50000 euros. Announced lending
rates are ranging from 4% to 43%. The fees have also large variation as opening fees vary from
0 to 450 euros and monthly fees from 0 to 25 euros.
Table 6: Comparison of Finnish lenders
Company Loan sum Interest rate Opening fee Monthly fee
Tapiola Bank ? ? ? ?
Danske Bank ? ? ? ?
Santander Finance 2000 - 50000 4 - 13 % 149 8
Nordax Bank 3000 - 30000 8 - 19 % ? ?
Nordea Bank 2000 - 25000 6 - 8 % 175 4,5
S-pankki Bank 5000 - 20000 6 - 18 % 100 7
Handels Banken Bank 2000 - 20000 5 % 100 5
OP Bank 3000 - 15000 7% 120 3
Bigbank Bank 500 - 10000 9 % - 95-195 8
Svea Finance 200 - 8500 9 - 22 % 135 9
LHV Finance 1000 - 6000 10 - 15 % 199 9
Joustolaina Finance 1000 - 4000 22 % 60 5
Credit 24 Finance 50 - 3000 36 - 43 % ? ?
Ellos Finance 100 - 2500 28 % 0 0
Ostosraha Finance 100 - 2500 19 % ? 5
Euroloan Finance 50 - 2000 7 - 29 % 0-450 0-24.5
Laina.fi Finance 50 - 2000 20 % ? ?
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One can hardly say that this market has found an equilibrium point, but it seems that
companies who offer larger loans also give cheaper prices for the loans. This could actually
support  the assumption that  the higher  loan sums are  priced lower  than smaller  loans.  If  we
look at the companies who offer loans of over 10000 euros we can see that the lower rate
boundary is between 4 % and 9 %. The higher boundary for interest rates is between 13 % and
19 % (excluding OP who is giving a constant rate for all  loans). That way the difference is not
that big if we assume that lower rate goes for the biggest loans. The difference in the
boundaries can be explained by the risk based pricing between those limits or the lender s
competence in risk identification. The lenders are supposed to optimize their prices to match
the level of risk identification they possess. For the smaller loans the market is moving towards
the small loan market where the risks and prices are getting higher. The opening fees do not
seem to have any clear pattern against loan sum.
Figure 11: The supply in Finnish market
In the Figure 11 I have illustrated the interest rate spreads and offered loan sums. The figure
does not show the effect of different fees, but the small loans carry relatively more fees than
the larger sums. The boxes in the picture present different lenders and show the loan sum and
interest rate area they operate. We do not know the actual rates for different loan sums, but it
seems clear that lenders who offer only small loans have higher interest rates than those who
0
%
30000-
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
46
offer  higher  loan  sums.  As  the  loan  sums  grow  the  rates  seems  to  go  down.  Between  the
extreme parts of the supply space the difference is clear. However, in the middle range the
difference is not that evident. It is not clear whether the interest rate is affected by the loan
sum or the risk evaluation. Some of the lenders informed different prices for different sums. For
example S-Pankki and Santander informed following interest rates according to the loan sum:
S-pankki
Sum 5000-10000 10000-15000 15000-20000
Rate 8 % 7 % 6 %
Santander
Sum 2000-5000 5000-20000 20000-40000 40000-50000
Rate 13 % 10 % 8 % 4 %
On the other hand Nordea informed that the rate is dependent on the customer rating level
(normal  customer,  regular  customer  or  key  customer)  and  the  spread  was  from  6  %  to  8%.
Most of the other lenders inform that loan contract is personalized for all individual borrowers.
It seems that banks are offering lower rates than finance companies and that would refer to
better knowledge about their customers.
If we look the situation in the RL-space the lenders are having different supply curves and they
are optimizing the prices by risk detection power. Different lenders are choosing to operate on
different risk levels depending on their investments on the risk detection (credit scoring or
information sharing). Those who have good scoring systems can offer better loan contracts for
the customers. Recall that in the RL-space this will bend the lenders supply curve downwards
and they can offer better price for given loan sum. This will also diminish the risk of moral
hazard because while the price gets lower the borrower s default cost stays the same.
The interest rate spread in the consumer loan market can be interpreted so that while in the
Jaffee & Russell model lenders optimized loan contracts over the loan sum L and interest rate
R, the risk identification factor X that was presented in the chapter 5.4.3 must also be taken
into account. If all lenders would have the same recourses the markets would run prices on
equilibrium points depending on the loan sums. In reality resources are different. Lenders have
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limited budgets and knowledge so they have to choose the market they are operating. Some
amount of uncertainty must be accepted but lenders can smooth the information asymmetry
by investing in information tools.
We can compare the market situation to Jaffee & Russell -model and assume that there is a
theoretical equilibrium rate for given loan sum. The lender can escape from it only by changing
the default risk measure. If he is raising the price he must accept the increase in the risk. The
price reduction, on the other hand, is sensible only if the lender can make better credit
decisions and this requires investments in information. At the same time, the borrower is trying
to get the loan for the best price available but he must settle for the price he is getting
according to his risk signal.  For an honest borrower who can signal his type to the lender this
gives advantage. He can get a lower price
In the Jaffee & Russell -model the supply curve was presented upward sloping or backward
bending. At the same time the market situation seems to suggest that the supply curve is
actually downward sloping. The reason might be that lenders are discriminating prices for
different loan sums. They are offering rates that are near the demand curve. Some lenders have
made the pricing very complex which can decrease the adverse selection. If pricing would be
clear the honest borrowers who get good credit rating would choose the cheapest loan.
Lenders with higher prices would then have only those customers others will reject. On the
other hand, if prices cannot be detected also the lenders with high prices might get better
customer portfolio.
In this kind of fragmented market where pricing is complex and comparison between lenders is
difficult the single market equilibrium does not seem to exist. There must be multiple
equilibrium points according to loan sum. I have studied mainly the informational asymmetries
that lenders are facing but it seems evident that also the borrowers are facing informational
challenges. When prices are made hard to compare the borrower will optimize a loan contract
by price and the effort he will put to comparison. The Jaffee & Russell -model seems a logical
frame to get familiar with the basic dynamics in lab setting, but in the real market the model
faces difficulties to explain different risk levels and equilibriums.
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6 Conclusions
In this study I have presented the basic setting of the consumer credit market. The theoretical
model was the Jaffee & Russell model from 1976. The literature from relevant field backs up
the basic characteristics of the model. However, it was seen that the model is a simplistic
representation of the actual market. It is most suitable for a market where lenders do not
demand collaterals against the loan and the loan products are simple. The model assumes only
two periods which is not the case in the Finnish consumer credit market. The loan contracts are
based on multiple periods and annuity schedules which give restrictions on the analysis based
on the model. Still the Jaffee & Russell model is simple and good tool for making assumptions
about market equilibriums, while the analyses must be taken cautiously.
I  showed  that  lenders  have  to  work  with  the  asymmetric  information  and  make  pricing
decisions regarding it. A lender cannot know for certain if the borrower will pay back the loan
and this will pull the prices up. If the lenders have limited information about borrowers the
honest borrowers have to pay higher prices and so compensate the defaults dishonest
borrowers accumulate to lenders. However, lenders can improve their knowledge about
borrowers and the default risk they carry. This can be done by information sharing platforms
and automated credit scoring. The information sharing platforms are used to share knowledge
that different lenders have about individual borrowers. It has been shown in the previous
research that information sharing benefits the market as a whole. The credit scoring models are
used to handle more effectively the available information that a lender possess. These models
can give competitive advantage for a lender if the default probability is identified more
accurately than in the market on average. Despite of this, a lender has to be careful with the
pricing and credit decisions. Wrong kind of pricing in the market might attract dishonest people
and run the defaults up. To capture the effect that information sharing and credit scoring has
on the supply I inserted into the model a variable that depicts the amount of information. The
investment on information raises the  cost but at the same time it enhances the quality
of the loan portfolio and decreases the defaults. As a lender learns to identify good borrowers
he can get  more volume by giving  higher  loan sums,  extract  profits  above his  supply  curve or
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price the loan under the market price. If a lender can offer better contract to borrowers it will
decrease adverse selection and moral hazard.
The analysis of Finnish consumer credit market showed somewhat different story than the
general Jaffee & Russell model.  The  pricing  in  the  market  seems  to  be  very  complex.  Some
lenders inform that they price the loan regarding the loan sum and others give price according
re of these two variables. A declining supply function can be
spotted depending on the loan sum but it seems evident that prices can differ relatively much
within the same loan size. This can be explained by two factors. First, the complex pricing can
make it hard for borrower to detect the cheapest loan. Second, the lenders are offering
personalized rates depending on the assumed default risk of a borrower. It can be argued that
lenders are discriminating the prices. They optimize the profits by choosing whether they want
to operate with relatively honest people and invest on risk detection or accept the high risk and
keep the prices high and loan sums low. If lender can make good credit decision he can
introduce competitive pricing.
The Jaffee & Russell model  is  a  good  framework  to  get  familiar  with  concepts  of  adverse
selection and moral hazard. However, for further study I would recommend to develop it. I
introduced how different individual risk identification abilities can be taken into account. This is
a good starting point but also the effect of complex pricing and multiple equilibriums require
further studying.
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